After a string of humiliating defeats at the hands of various ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), the collapse of Myanmar’s junta—the State Administrative Council (SAC)—is an increasingly plausible scenario.
As such, China’s heightened involvement in Myanmar at this crucial time is no coincidence. The visits of high-ranking Chinese officials, the summoning of ERO leaders and invitations extended to Myanmar’s political elders to Beijing all signal China’s desire to keep Myanmar firmly within its sphere of influence.
Despite its official policy on non-interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs, China has strategically hedged its bets on both sides of the conflict to protect its economic and security interests.
Along with Russia, it remains a major arms supplier to the junta and uses its veto power at the UN to shield the regime. Simultaneously, China provides economic and military support to several EROs along the Chinese border that have long fought Myanmar’s military for greater autonomy.
Beijing appears to favor a weakened SAC that maintains control over central Myanmar while ceding peripheral territories to the EROs. China likely seeks to legitimize this arrangement by facilitating an election where political parties aligned with armed groups divide seats in the national assembly, prioritizing a ceasefire at any cost.
This approach disregards the majority of the Myanmar people’s desire for the military to be entirely removed from politics, with its role limited solely to national defense.
It is well known that China tacitly endorsed the launch of Operation 1027 by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and Arakan Army, only to later restrain them through the Haigeng Ceasefire Agreement it mediated.
However, China may have misjudged some EROs. A few might prefer independence from China’s patronizing influence if they could secure genuine autonomy under a federal democratic system in a new Myanmar.
For instance, the TNLA has openly collaborated with the PDFs, which are largely aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG)—the shadow parallel government of Myanmar’s democratic opposition—despite China’s subtle attempts to curb the fighting.
China’s hesitation to engage, at least officially, with the NUG likely stems from either distrust in its capabilities or concerns about Western influence over the group.
Additionally, the prospect of a democracy emerging so close to its borders may be unsettling for Beijing. However, this stance overlooks the broad popular support the NUG commands within Myanmar.
Historically, the NUG has enjoyed stronger ties with certain EROs such as the Karen, Karenni, Kachin and Chin groups—collectively known as the K3C alliance—although only the Kachin share a border with China.
In contrast, the northern Shan EROs are landlocked and heavily reliant on China for everything including daily essentials. In July 2024, Beijing flexed its influence by cutting off electricity to Laukkai, an area controlled by the MNDAA. China also closed border trading gates between the two countries, cutting off revenue streams to EROs who rely on toll collections.
A recent scathing letter from the previously unknown Ruili City State Security Commission demanded that the TNLA cease fighting the junta, further signaling China’s displeasure. China also rattled its saber recently by conducting live fire drills near the Myanmar border.
These actions could give the Myanmar military time to regroup, redeploying forces from the Shan and Kachin theaters to focus on defeating other EROs such as the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), Arakan Army, Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and PDFs in other regions.
This has already occurred in Loikaw, the capital of Karenni State, where junta forces recently regained control from the KNDF. This underscores the importance of Myanmar’s revolutionary forces finding ways to overcome China’s coercion.
The West, including the United States, does not prioritize Myanmar geopolitically as much as areas in the Middle East, Taiwan or Ukraine, and significant aid remains lacking. Opposition forces must, therefore, strengthen internal alliances and secure supply lines independent of China.
The KNDF and the Karen National Union (KNU) control a porous border with Thailand, which could be used to route supplies northward. Similarly, the Arakan Army and Chin groups share a long border with India, through which resources could be funneled.
If supplies reach Chin state, they can be transferred to northern Saggaing and then to Kachin and northern Shan. Securing these regions would allow supplies from India to bypass China’s blockade and reach northern Shan.
At this critical juncture, the NUG and EROs must enhance their collaboration for the greater good. The EROs must recognize that yielding to China’s pressure will only allow the junta to survive, prolonging their territorial struggles and deepening their dependence on China.
Despite their military strength, these groups risk continued marginalization on the global stage, as they are viewed as guerrilla forces rather than political actors.
ERO leaders who fall out of favor with China also risk serious consequences, as evidenced by the extradition of Border Guard Force leaders from Laukkai to China during the crackdown on cybercrime cartels.
For the EROs the path to lasting peace, dignity and prosperity lies in uniting to build a new, federal, democratic Myanmar. Crucially, the NUG must build stronger trust with the EROs.
Despite its efforts to be inclusive, key positions in the NUG are still held by Bamar ethnics and former National League for Democracy members, which could raise doubts about its commitment to diversity and true federalism in a future, post-junta Myanmar.
Furthermore, the NUG’s absence of a single charismatic leader is a glaring weakness. To gain the full support and buy-in from the EROs, the NUG must be able to convincingly present its vision for a new Myanmar.
Yet the onus is on both. EROs and the NUG must recognize that their strength lies in unity. Only through close collaboration can they hope to outmaneuver China’s coercion and topple the junta. Cooperating and maximizing each other’s strength holds the key.
Than N Oo is a Myanmar democracy activist and a co-founder of the Free Myanmar advocacy group.