According to media reports, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is proposing to force Palestinian civilians out of northern Gaza and declare a ‘closed military zone’. Likud MP Avichai Boaron told The Guardian that ‘the IDF will evacuate all the civilians who are in the north of Gaza, from the border to the Gaza River’, on the basis that ‘[w]hen the civilians population has left, you can find and kill all the terrorists without harming the civilians’.
Evacuations are a common practice in armed conflicts, serving as an indispensable means to temporarily move people away from hostilities to protect them from harm. However, evacuations can also expose evacuees to significant risks. During active conflict, they are not only a dangerous undertaking but also displace people from their homes, exposing them to additional risks associated with displacement.
Netanyahu’s plan offers a timely opportunity to reflect on how international law regulates the evacuation of civilians during armed conflicts. This post demonstrates that while international humanitarian law (IHL) permits and, in some cases, requires the evacuation of civilians, forced evacuations are only justified under strict conditions.
The duty to evacuate
The duty to evacuate people in armed conflicts is well-established in IHL. It is conceptually rooted in the general obligations of parties to armed conflicts to take precautionary measures to avoid or minimize harm to those protected under IHL. Within the categories of ‘protected persons’, civilians are likely the largest group requiring evacuation. Article 58 of Additional Protocol I obligates parties to a conflict to evacuate civilians from areas near military objectives.
However, the duty to evacuate is not absolute. It does not apply when it is neither feasible nor safe to evacuate people.
First, parties are not expected to evacuate individuals when it is objectively impossible to do so. This limitation is reflected in article 58 of Additional Protocol I. The feasibility of evacuation depends on both the responsible actors’ ability to conduct safe evacuations and the prevailing military context. As Biggerstaff recounts in a detailed piece for the Lieber Institute, in some cases, parties may simply be unable to evacuate persons; although where this is the result of a lack of resources, they may need to seek external assistance, such as from the ICRC. In other cases, evacuations may not be feasible from a military perspective. Factors to consider include the risks that the evacuation may pose to the party’s military objectives, the constraints evacuation operations place on available resources, and the extent to which the evacuees would benefit from relocation. Depending on the circumstances, it may not be feasible to evacuate everyone or do so immediately. In such cases, priority may be given to the most vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly, or the sick.
Secondly, parties are also not obligated to evacuate protected persons when it is unsafe to do so. Although this is not explicitly stated in treaty texts, the ICRC Commentaries clarify this condition. For instance, they note that evacuations ‘should not go beyond the point where the life of the population would become difficult or even impossible’ (para. 2245) and ‘should not be more dangerous than remaining in place’ (para. 4586). However, the inability to safely evacuate does not absolve parties of their duty to provide protection. In such cases, parties must avoid exposing protected persons to danger and, if necessary, allow third parties to provide humanitarian assistance.
Furthermore, the duty to evacuate does not always extend to all civilians equally, leaving some flexibility to account for the specific circumstances of individuals or groups for whom evacuation may be necessary and appropriate. For example, parties may be required to evacuate vulnerable subgroups, such as children, mothers, the elderly, and the sick, due to their heightened vulnerabilities in armed conflict, while the evacuation of others may not yet be necessary (ICRC Commentaries para. 2247). The same applies to specific sites, like hospitals and refugee camps, which may need to be evacuated before others. Conversely, certain individuals within a group should not be evacuated if relocation would expose them to greater risks than staying in place, even when it is safe for others in that group to do so (see e.g., article 9 of Geneva Convention III).
When the duty to evacuate does apply, parties are responsible for ensuring the safe evacuation of protected persons. The obligations regarding prisoners of war and persons hors de combat suggest that parties must remove them from the hostilities. However, the same expectations may not be feasible for large civilian populations. Therefore, it may be reasonable to interpret the duty to evacuate civilians as an obligation of conduct rather than result. This interpretation parallels the duty to evacuate in peacetime, implying that parties must take necessary steps to compel and facilitate evacuations to the greatest extent possible, but they are not obligated to physically remove people from danger zones.
The duty to evacuate civilians thus implies that parties must plan for evacuations, issue evacuation orders when needed, facilitate the process, and enforce these orders as long as necessary. In many cases, this duty is fulfilled by issuing advance warnings to civilians, instructing them to leave areas where an attack is imminent. However, such warnings are only effective if civilians are given sufficient time to evacuate and if safe escape routes are available. This highlights a key substantial aspect of the duty: parties are obligated to ensure the safe evacuation of protected persons. IHL provides several mechanisms to achieve this, including through evacuation agreements between belligerent parties and opening humanitarian corridors. The important point to emphasize here is that these measures are integral to the duty to evacuate, setting minimum standards for its implementation.
Restrictions on evacuations
While recognizing the critical importance of evacuations for protecting civilians during armed conflicts, IHL imposes strict limitations on when and how parties to a conflict can order and enforce evacuations. These limitations stem primarily from the prohibition against forcible transfers and deportations of civilians, codified in article 49(1) of Geneva Convention IV. While the emphasis of the text lies on preventing the removal of civilians from occupied territory, the prohibition also applies to movements within occupied territory, seeking to prevent arbitrary internal displacement. The prohibition is relevant to all armed conflicts: article 17 of Additional Protocol II explicitly forbids the displacement of civilian populations during non-international armed conflicts. Moreover, the prohibition is widely recognized as customary international law by states, as well as domestic and international courts, and is supported by the ICRC.
The only exception to the prohibition against the forcible movement of protected persons concerns evacuations. However, as expressed in article 49(2) of Geneva Convention IV, it is highly restrictive, with three major limitations: (1) evacuations must only be ordered for the security of the population or for imperative military reasons; (2) protected persons must not be moved outside the occupied territory unless it is unavoidable; and (3) evacuees must be allowed to return home as soon as hostilities have ended. Furthermore, parties must ensure that forced evacuations are carried out in a humane manner (article 49(3)). Together, these restrictions are intended as safeguards to protect the interests of the affected population and prevent arbitrary displacement.
The first of these is particularly relevant to the proposed plan ostensibly under active consideration by Netanyahu. While the Geneva Conventions do not elaborate on the precise meaning of ‘imperative military reasons’, case law from international courts and tribunals has established key criteria for interpreting this ground. Courts have set a high threshold for accepting imperative military reasons as a justification, only doing so when civilian evacuations are deemed vital to the success of broader military operations. Military advantage alone is generally insufficient to justify forced evacuations, although military necessity may meet the bar. Moreover, evacuations can only be justified in the face of actual, rather than hypothetical, military threats. The conduct of the evacuating party also plays a crucial role: evacuations planned well in advance may indicate ulterior motives and threats created by the evacuating power itself cannot serve as justification. Furthermore, evacuations must be carried out in a safe and secure manner that allows for the eventual return of civilians. Any violent or persecutory actions during evacuations can invalidate claims of imperative military reasons.
When forced evacuations fail to meet the conditions outlined above, they are unlawful and violate the prohibition against forcible transfers or deportations of civilians. Given the severe impact on displaced evacuees, such cases are typically taken very seriously by the international community, as illustrated by the evacuation of Eastern Aleppo in 2016 (see here and here).
The consequences of unlawful evacuations can be grave. They not only violate IHL but may also result in criminal liability for those individuals responsible. Forcible transfers and deportations are classified as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, which state parties are obligated to prosecute those responsible (article 147 Geneva Convention IV). In addition, these acts are recognized as war crimes under the Rome Statute, which explicitly lists unlawful transfers and deportations of civilians as offences within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (article 8(2)(a)(viii)), and they may also serve as evidence of genocidal intent, as previously discussed on this blog. This sends a clear warning to those considering civilian evacuations, emphasizing that they must only do so for the genuine protection of civilians and not for any other purpose.
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